Purpose: Smart cities provide fully integrated and networked connectivity between digital 2 infrastructure assets and physical infrastructure to form digital economies. However, industrial 3 espionage, cyber-crime and deplorable politically driven cyber-interventions threaten to 4 disrupt and/ or physically damage the critical infrastructure that supports national wealth 5 generation and preserves the health, safety and welfare of the populous. This research presents 6 a comprehensive review of cyber-threats confronting critical infrastructure asset management 7 reliant upon a common data environment (CDE) to augment building information modelling 8 (BIM) implementation. 9
INTRODUCTION 28
We will neglect our cities to our peril, for in neglecting them we neglect the nation -John F. 29
Kennedy 30
Throughout history, buildings and infrastructure (that cumulatively constitute the built 31 environment) have provided physically secure sanctuaries, protecting inhabitants from theft 32 and malicious attacks (Toy, 2006 ). Today's built environment is no exception and conserves 33
Operations (AECO) sector -a sector that encapsulates includes the whole lifecycle of a 48 building's development and subsequent use (Nye, 2017) . For example, the UK government's 49 mandated policy 'Digital Built Britain 2025' represents a prominent epitome of ambitious plans 50 to coalesce digitized economies and infrastructure deployment (HM Gov, 2015) . This strategic 51 vision has been enacted via the building information modelling (BIM) Level 2 mandate to 52 extend the frontiers of digitized asset handover for building and infrastructure asset owners 53 (HM Gov, 2013) . BIM has orchestrated a paradigm shift in the way that information is 54 managed, exchanged and transformed, to stimulating greater collaboration between 55 stakeholders who interact within a common data environment (CDE) throughout the whole 56 pollution (ibid). These dystopian challenges can be alleviated through for example, shrewd 102 allocation of resources via social circumscription measures (UN, 2014b). However, politicians 103 worldwide have also contemplated the implicit assumption of technology inertia as an 104 impediment to government reform (c.f. Mokyr, 1992) . Policies subsequently developed have 105 responded accordingly by mandating advanced technologies within smart city development as 106 a panacea to these challenges within the AECO sector -a sector sensu stricto berated for its 107 reluctance to innovate (BSI, 2014a) . Despite a notable disinclination to change, the AECO 108 sector is widely espoused as being a quintessential economic stimulus (Eastman et government's strategic agenda (Bradley et al., 2016) . Unabated advancements in 121 computerization have widened the capability of decision support to providing appropriate 122 resolutions to pertinent infrastructure challenges such as: optimizing planning and economic 123 development (Ryan, 2017) ; ensuring resilient clean air, water and food supply (ibid); and/ or 124 safeguarding integrated data and security systems (BSIa 2014). Throughout the various stages 125 of an infrastructure asset's lifecycle this transition is further fortified by BIM technology and 126 the use of a CDE that can improve information and performance management (Pärn and 127 Within practice, the term smart cities is a linguistic locution that encapsulates fully integrated 147 and networked connectivity between digital infrastructure assets and physical infrastructure 148 assets to form digital economies (BSI, 2014a). A perspicacious hive mentality is inextricably 149 embedded within smart city philosophy and serves to augment intelligent analysis of real-time 150 data and information generated to rapidly optimize decisions in a cost effective manner 151 (Szyliowicz, 2013; Zamparini and Shiftan, 2013) . Consequently, smart cities within the digital 152 built environment form a cornerstone of a digital economy that seeks to i) provide more with 153 less; ii) maximize resource availability; iii) reduce cost and carbon emissions (whole lifecycle); 154 iv) enable significant domestic and international growth; and v) ensure that an economy 155 remains in the international vanguard (HM Gov, 2015). The unrelenting pace of digitization 156 worldwide is set to continue with an expected $400bn (US Dollars) investment allocated for 157 smart city development by 2020; where smart infrastructure will consist of circa 12% of the 158 cost (DBIS, 2013 ). Yet, despite this substantial forecast expenditure, scant academic attention 159 has hitherto been paid to the complex array of interconnected arteries of infrastructural asset 160 management (e.g. roads, ports, rail, aviation and telecommunications) that provide an essential 161 gateway to global markets (ibid.). 162
163
The Omnipresent Threat of Cyber-Espionage and Crime 164
Prior to meticulous review of papers an established understanding of the omnipresent threat of 165 cyber-espionage and crime is required. The implementation of smart city technologies has 166 inadvertently increased the risk of cyber-attack facilitated through expansive networked 167 systems (Mayo, 2016) . However, cyber-crime has been largely overlooked within the built 168 environment and academic consensus concurs that a cavernous gap exists between the state of 169 7 security in practice and the achieved level of security maturity in standards (Markets and 170 Markets, 2014). Security specialists and practitioners operating smart buildings, grids and 171 infrastructures are said to coexist in a redundant dichotomy. Instead, academic and policy 172 attention has focused upon either: i) hypothesized scenarios within international security 173 studies (e.g. the protection of military, industrial and commercial secrets) (Rid, 2012) ; ii) policy 174 planning for cyber-warfare (McGraw, 2013); and/ or iii) the safety of computer systems or 175 networks per se rather than cyber-physical attack (activities that could severely impact upon 176 nuclear enrichment, hospital operations, public building operation and maintenance, and traffic 177 management) (Stoddart, 2016) . Threats from cyber-crime have arisen partially because of the 178 increased adoption rate of networked devices but also as a result of industry's operational 179 dependency upon IT systems (Boyes, 2013b) . 180 181 Cyber-criminals are particularly adept at harnessing the intrinsic intangible value of digital 182 assets (BSI, 2015) and can decipher the digital economy and its intricacies more perceptively 183 than their counterpart industrialists and businesses that are under attack (Kello, 2013) . The 184 most recent 'WannaCry' ransomware attack personified the sophisticated measures deployed 185 by cyber-criminals in navigating networks and identifying, extracting and monetizing data 186 found (Hunton, 2012) . While the inherent value of digital assets to owners and creators is often 187 indeterminate, cyber-criminals manipulate data and information to encrypt, ransom or sell it 188 piecemeal (Marinos, 2016) . Several prominent instances of unsecure critical infrastructure 189 assets being physically damaged by persistent cyber-crime have been widely reported upon 190 (Peng, et al., 2015) . These include: the STUXNET worm that disarmed the Iranian industrial/ 191 military assets at a nuclear facility (Lindsay, 2013) ; and the malware 'WannaCry' that caused 192 significant damage to the UK's National Health Service (NHS) patient databases, German 193 railway operations and businesses globally (Clarke and Youngstein, 2017) . Cyber-attacks 194 remain an omnipresent national security threat to a digital economy's prosperity and digital 195 built environment's functionality and safety. Reporting upon a veritable plethora of threats 196 posed presents significant challenges, as cyber-attacks engender greater anonymity as a 197 malicious activity (Fisk, 2012) . Nevertheless, known cases and revolutionary deterrents will 198 form the premise upon which this literature review is based. 
CYBERSPACE, CYBER-PHYSCIAL ATTACKS AND CRITICAL 226

INFRASTRUCTURE HACKS 227
In the UK, security analysts from MI5 and MI6 have warned that industrial cyber-espionage is 228 increasing in prevalence, sophistication and maturity, and could enable an entire shut down of 229 critical infrastructure and services including power, transport, food and water supplies 230 common sources of nefarious attacks in its malware taxonomy, including: viruses; worms; 266 trojans; botnets; spywares; scarewares; roguewares; adwares; and greywares (Marinos, 2016) . 267 268 Such attacks are made possible via a huge cyber-attack surface within cyber-space, where every 269 circa 2,500 lines of code presents a potential vulnerability that is identified by a hacker's 270 reconnaissance (Nye, 2017) . Reconnaissance is the first and most important stage for a 271 successful cyber-attack and seeks to determine the likely strategy for the intrusion (Marinos, 272 2016 
CYBER-ATTACK MOTIVATIONS AND CYBER ACTORS AND INCIDENT 278
ANALYSIS 279
The RISI database contains a comprehensive record of cyber-physical attack incidents 280 categorized as either confirmed or likely but confirmed (RISI, 2015). However, prominent 281 commentators contend that attacks are more prevalent than reports suggest and that victims are 282 often reluctant to disclose malicious cyber-attacks against themselves due to potential 283 reputational damage being incurred (Reggiani, 2013) . Cyber-physical attacks are therefore 284 shrouded in secrecy by states and private companies, and many states have already conceded 285 the current digital arms race against a panoply of cyber-actors (or 'hackers') including: 286 hacktivists, malware authors, cyber-criminals, cyber-militias, cyber-terrorists, patriot hackers 287 and script kiddies. within models built begins to swell and the data contained within becomes accessible to an 394 increased amount of stakeholders. As a consequence, the magnitude of potential cyber-crime 395 also increases and it is imperative therefore, that effective cyber-security deterrence measures 396 are set. 397
398
Perhaps the most crippling aspect of deterrence is the poor rate of attribution (also known as 399 tracebacking or source tracking); where attribution seeks to determine the identity or location 400 of an attacker or attacker's intermediary (Brantly, 2014) . Affiliation further exacerbates 401 aattribution rates, for example, nefarious and malicious attacks on critical infrastructure by 402 non-state 'patriot' actors who proclaim cyber-warfare in the name of nationalist ideologies can 403 create ambiguity with state actors (Lindsay, 2015) . Extant literature widely acknowledges that 404 states actively recruit highly skilled hackers to counter-attack other state governed cyber-405 activities, in particular against critical infrastructure assets ( Thomas, 2009 ). Yet the paucity of 406 14 identification or disclosure of attacker identities has made the hacking culture even more 407 enticing for both non-state actors and state actors. Whilst network attribution or IP address 408 traceability to a particular geographical region is possible, lifting the cyber veil to reveal the 409 affiliation between the attacker and their government remains difficult (Canfil, 2016) Infrastructure provides the essential arteries and tributaries of a digital built environment that 551 underpins a contemporary digital economy. However, cyber-attack threatens the availability 552 and trustworthiness of interdependent networked services on both corporate and national 553 security levels. At particular risk are the critical infrastructure assets (such as energy networks, 554 transport and financial services) hosted on large networks connected to the internet (via a CDE) 555 to enable cost-efficient remote monitoring and maintenance. Any disruption or damage to these 556 assets could have an immediate and widespread impact by jeopardizing the well-being, safety 557 and security of citizens. To combat the potential threat posed, greater awareness among AECO 558 stakeholders is urgently needed; this must include governments internationally and private 559 sector partners collaborating together to expand upon existing ISO and BIM-related standards 560
for improved response to a cyber incident. As well as preventative measures, reactive national 561 plans are required (i.e. raising cyber security awareness on government funded BIM projects) 562 to quickly deal with breaches in security and ensure services are provided with minimum 563 disruption. 564
565
It is argued in this paper that the CDE adopted with BIM in the AECO sector acts as a 566 springboard for the wider stakeholder engagement with networked data sharing in a centralized 567 manner yielding such systems vulnerable for future cyber-physical attacks. The pinnacle of 568 cyber-security research breakthroughs in cryptography have resulted in the development of 569 decentralized block chain technology. It is hypothesized that block chain technology offers a 570 novel and secure approach to storing information, making data transactions, performing 571 functions, and establishing trust, making it suitable for sensitive digital infrastructure data 572 contained in BIM and CDE environment high security requirements. Whilst block chain 573 applications are largely at a nascent stage of development within the AECO sector, this review 574 paper has highlighted its novel application to fortify security of digital assets residing within a 575 19 BIM and CDE environment -thus extending applications beyond its origins in cryptocurrency. 576 Future research will be required to prove, modify or disprove this hypothesis presented. 577
However, block chain alone cannot guarantee total immunity to cyber-attacks so additional 578 research is required to: understand the motivations for cyber-attack/ crime; identify the specific 579 operational threats to bespoke critical infrastructure and develop appropriate strategies to 580 mitigate these; develop more exhaustive international standards (or enhance existing standards) 581 to distinguish between physical destruction and theft; and establish measures needed to 582 consolidate greater international governmental collaboration. 583 584 
